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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the impact of network characteristics on airfares. Our central hypothesis is
that any force that increases traffic volume on the spokes of a network will reduce fares in the
markets that it serves. This effect arises because of increasing returns on the spokes. For
example, since a large network (as measured by the number of city pairs that it connects) is
expected to have low costs per passenger as a result of high traffic densities, fares in the
individual markets served should be low, other things equal. Similarly, holding size fixed, a
network that connects large cities should have higher traffic densities on its spokes (and thus
lower fares in individual markets) than one serving small cities. Our empirical analysis supports
that predictions. We find that network characteristics are important determinants of fares in 4-
segment city-pair markets (these are markets requiring a connection at the hub). Furthermore,
our empirical model predicts that the TWA-Ozark and Northwest-Republic mergers should have
reduced fares in the 4-segment markets served by the hubs at St. Louis and Minneapolis.

Fare Determination in Airline Hub-and-Spoke Networks
by
Jan K. Brueckner, Nichola J. Dyer, and Pablo T. Spiller
1. Introduction
Airline deregulation has led to profound changes in the structure of the
industry. In addition to giving airlines the freedom to set fares,
deregulation removed restrictions on entry and exit, allowing the carriers to
expand and rationalize their route structures . *- This flexibility led in the
1980 's to a dramatic expansion of hub-and- spoke networks, where passengers
change planes at a hub airport on the way to their eventual destinations. By
funneling all passengers into a hub, such a system generates high traffic
densities on its "spoke" routes. This allows the airline to exploit economies
of scale from frequent operation of large aircraft on the spokes, yielding
lower cost per passenger.^
Restructuring of the industry in response to deregulation has also led to
renewed interest among economists in the determinants of airfares in individual
city-pair markets. This new line of research contains notable contributions by
Berry (1990), Borenstein (1989), Call and Keeler (1985), Graham, Kaplan, and
'•For discussion of the impact of the new regulatory environment on airline
operations, see Bailey and Williams (1988), Bailey, Graham and Kaplan
(1985), Levine (1988), Moore (1986), and Morrison and Winston (1986). A
measure of the increase in "hubbing" is provided by McShan and Windle
(1990) , who show that the total enplanements of each carrier became
increasingly concentrated at selected airports over the 1980' s.
'For documentation of economies of scale (or, equivalently , economies of
density), see Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984). Using the same type
of estimating equation, McShan and Windle (1990) show that airline costs
fall as the extent of "hubbing" grows. Another benefit of a hub-and-spoke
system from a passenger's point of view is that there is no need on a
multiple-segment trip to change carriers at the intermediate airport. For
an analysis of the valuation placed on this convenience, see Carlton,
Landes , and Posner (1980). For a related analysis of coordination between
network carriers, see Carlton and Klamer (1983).
Sibley (1983), and Morrison and Winston (1989, 1990). These studies typically
explore the connection between airfares and market -specific measures of demand
(city populations and incomes, tourism potential), cost (flight distance, load
factors), and competition (number of competitors, market share). However, even
though the airline industry has undergone a hub-and-spoke revolution, the
impact of network characteristics on fares in individual markets has received
little attention in this literature. 3 Given that networks play a critical role
in lowering airline costs, this may be a serious omission. When a hub-and-
spoke network successfully raises traffic densities, ticket prices are likely
to reflect the resulting lower cost per passenger. Fare regressions that omit
network variables may fail to capture such effects.
The purpose of the present paper is to fill this gap in the literature by
studying the impact of network characteristics on airfares in an empirical
framework that includes many of the traditional market- specific variables. Our
central hypothesis is that any force that increases traffic volume on the
spokes of a network will reduce fares in the markets that it serves. This
effect arises because of increasing returns on the spokes. For example, since
a large network (as measured by the number of city pairs that it connects)
offers many potential destinations to the residents of an endpoint city, its
spokes should have higher traffic densities than the spokes of a small network.
With costs correspondingly lower, fares in the individual markets served should
be lower in the large network, other things equal. Similarly, holding size
-^Borenstein (1989) and Morrison and Winston (1989, 1990) include measures of
the carrier's airport dominance at the endpoints of a market. Although this
variable provides some information about the network, it does not capture
the type of network effects studied in this paper. Using an approach
somewhat similar to ours, Berry (1990) includes the numbers of routes served
out of each endpoint city as explanatory variables. These variables,
however, are not grounded in an explicit model of network effects.
fixed, a network that connects large cities should have higher traffic
densities on its spokes (and thus lower fares in individual markets) than one
serving small cities. Our emphasis on network variables, which include
measures of network size and "population potential," distinguishes the present
fare study from earlier research.
Two other distinguishing features of the paper are noteworthy. First,
although our main hypothesis relates to the effect of traffic densities on
fares, we do not attempt to measure densities directly.^ Instead, network
characteristics are used to infer densities in an indirect manner. This
approach avoids the simultaneity between traffic and fares, linking fares
instead to the exogenous features of airline networks.
Second, rather than focus on all types of city-pair markets, we restrict
attention to those markets where travel involves a four-segment round trip
through a hub airport. Two-segment markets, where travel requires no change of
plane (e.g., New York-Chicago, Los Angeles-San Francisco), are thus not
considered. The reason is that since two-segment markets are likely to have
large cities as endpoints, high traffic density can be achieved on the route
(and economies of scale exhausted) without the help of a hub-and-spoke system.
Therefore, the characteristics of the network serving many two -segment markets
are probably not critical in explaining fares. Four-segment markets, on the
other hand, are likely to include at least one small or medium-size endpoint
city. In this case, the traffic-collection function of the network plays a
critical role in reducing the costs of serving the minor endpoint. The
network's characteristics should thus have an effect on fares in the market.
^Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983) include traffic levels on the right-hand
side of their fare equation. In a similar vein, Borenstein (1989) uses the
airline's load factor in the market as an explanatory variable. Both
studies undertake appropriate simultaneity corrections.
Our focus on 4- segment markets is unique and also bears on the current
concern regarding excessive concentration at certain hub airports. As a result
of recent mergers, TWA and Northwest now dominate the hubs at St. Louis and
Minneapolis -St. Paul, respectively. This domination makes higher fares likely
for passengers originating or terminating at these airports, a prediction that
has been partly confirmed by Borenstein (1990), U.S. General Accounting Office
(1988), U.S. Deparment of Transportation (1989), and Werden, Joskow, and
Johnson (1989). Although concern about the effects of concentration is
certainly warranted, discussions of the issue have overlooked the fact that
local traffic accounts for just part of the enplanements at the dominated hubs
(37% in the case of St. Louis, according to the GAO) , with connecting traffic
making up the rest. Given that connecting passengers often have a choice of
hubs through which to make their trip, concentration at a particular hub does
not mean elimination of competition in the 4-segment markets. Moroever, the
larger hub network created by a merger is likely to have lower costs per
passenger than the original networks as a result of higher traffic densities.
The concentrated hub may thus offer more effective "interhub" competition in
the non-hub city-pair markets than did the pre-merger carriers, leading to
lower fares in such markets. The magnitude of such effects, which offer a
counterweight to fare increases for hub-originating or hub- terminating
passengers, are computed using the fare equations estimated below.
The data for this study is drawn from Databank 1A of the Department of
Transportation's Origin and Destination Survey , a source that has been used by
many other researchers. The period of study is the 4th quarter of 1985. This
data set, which comes from a 10 percent quarterly sample of all airline
tickets, shows the dollar fare for each observed itinerary (i.e., carrier-route
combination)
. The itinerary data is used to reconstruct the airline networks
in 1985, and the resulting network characteristics are then merged with the
fare observations to carry out the fare regressions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the comparative -
static properties of a simple theoretical model of a hub-and-spoke system,
which are used to generate empirical hypotheses. Section 3 explains how the
network characteristics are computed and shows the key features of the major
networks operating in 1985. Section 4 describes the market-specific variables
used in the fare regressions, and Section 5 presents the empirical results.
Section 6 simulates the estimated equation to predict the effect of the TWA-
Ozark and Northwest-Republic mergers, and Section 7 offers conclusions.
2. A Simple Network Model
This section sketches Brueckner and Spiller's (1989) model of a hub-and-
spoke network in order to develop empirical hypotheses . ^ Suppose that a
monopoly airline operates the four-city network depicted in Figure 1, where
city H is the hub. Residents of each city have a demand for air travel to
every other city of the network, including the hub. Demand is symmetric across
city-pairs, with D(Q) giving the inverse demand function for round- trip travel
in each market. Q is total traffic in both directions in the market, so that
QaB- f° r example, equals the number of passengers making round trips from A to
B and back plus passengers making round trips from B to A and back. Letting
R(Q) " QD(Q) be the revenue function, total revenue from the network is then
R(Qab) + r (Qac) + r (Qbc) + r (Qah> + r (Qbh) + r (Qch) (D
(the last three terms are revenues in city-pair markets that include the hub)
.
^For another network model, see Spiller (1989)
Costs are represented by the function c(Q), which gives the total cost of
carrying a round- trip traffic volume of Q on a particular spoke of the network.
With increasing returns to scale (or, following Caves, et_al. (1984),
increasing returns to density), c satisfies c' > and c" < 0. As noted above,
the reason for increasing returns is that higher traffic on a spoke allows the
airline to operate larger, more efficient aircraft and to use its fixed ground
facilities and personnel more intensively. Given that each spoke of the
network carries traffic in three city-pair markets, total network cost is equal
to
cCQab+Qac+Qah) + cCQab+^bc+Qbh) + cCQac+Qbc+Qch) • < 2 >
To maximize profit [(1) minus (2)], the monopolist sets marginal revenue
in each city-pair market equal to the marginal cost of a passenger in the
market. In a hub- inclusive city-pair market such as AH, marginal cost is
simply c' for the AH spoke, so that the first-order condition is
R'(Qah) - c'CQab+Qac-kJah)- (3)
In a non-hub market such as AB, marginal cost is the sum of the c' expressions
for the two spokes connecting the cities, so that the first-order condition is
R'(QAB) = c» (QaF^AC+Qah) + c'(QAB+QBC-K3BH ). (4)
Since the solution to the monopolist's problem is symmetric across
markets, the model is easily extended to a network containing n non-hub cities
plus the hub. Let Qjjjj be traffic in each non-hub market and Q^ be traffic in
each hub- inclusive market. Profit from the network is then
(n(n-l)/2)R(QNH ) + nR(QH ) - nc(QH+(n-l)QNH ) (5)
(note that there are n(n-l)/2 non-hub markets, n hub-inclusive markets, and n
spokes). The monopolist's first-order conditions have the same form as (3) and
(4).
When specific functional forms are imposed, this model can be used to
analyse the effects of various changes in the monopolist's environment. If
marginal revenue and cost are both linear, with R' (Q) «= t - Q and c'(Q) =
1 - zQ, where t, z > 0, then the following results can be established. First,
an increase in n, the number of cities served by the network, raises traffic
and lowers fares in all markets. As explained in the introduction, the reason
is that the resulting higher traffic densities allow more effective
exploitation of increasing returns. Second, higher demand (a larger t) raises
traffic in all markets while changing fares in a direction that depends on the
degree of increasing returns. Fares in the non-hub markets fall when
increasing returns are strong (when z is large) and rise otherwise, an outcome
familiar from standard monopoly models. This result shows that the high
demand associated with large city populations, for example, will lead to lower
fares as long as increasing returns are strong.
Brueckner and Spiller (1989) provide a detailed analysis of the effects
of competition in the four-city model. They discuss the effect of "interhub"
competition in market AB (where another airline serves the market through a
symmetric hub system) , "direct" competition in AB (where a competitor provides
non-stop service in the market) , and "leg" competition in market AH (where an
isolated competitor serves this hub-inclusive market) . Although the effects of
competition vary somewhat across cases, the typical outcome is that competition
leads to lower fares in the market where it occurs while raising fares in all
other markets in the network . The intuitive explanation of this result is
"Fares in the hub- inclusive markets fall as t rises,
8straightforward. Introduction of competition in a market (AB, for example)
lowers traffic on the network spokes (AH and BH) that serve the market. With
increasing returns, this traffic leakage raises the marginal cost of a
passenger on each spoke. While competitive pressure in AB counteracts the
higher marginal costs, reducing fares in the market, other markets that use the
affected spokes (markets AC, BC, AH, and BH) lack competition. As a result,
fares in these markets rise and traffic levels fall.' This outcome is a
consequence of increasing returns together with the cost complementarities
inherent to a hub -and- spoke network. In such a setting, competition generates
negative externalities outside the market where it occurs.
The above results, along with those dealing with demand and network size,
are not realistic because the benchmark case is a monopoly hub-and-spoke
system, none of which exist. However, the conclusions are suggestive and can
be used to motivate an empirical study. The results lead to the following
empirical hypotheses: (i) a market served by a large hub-and-spoke network
should have lower fares than a market served by a small network; (ii) when
increasing returns are strong, a market with high demand should have lower
fares than a market with low demand; (iii) a market where competition occurs
should have lower fares than a market without competition; (iv) a market served
by a network facing widespread competition (and thus a large traffic leakage)
should have higher fares than a market served by a network facing little
competition. In the next section of the paper, we discuss some of the network
variables used to test these hypotheses.
'The reduction in traffic in the AC and BC markets in turn raises marginal
cost on the CH spoke, which leads to a higher fare and lower traffic in the
CH market.
93. Network Characteristics
The data for the study are drawn from Databank 1A (DB1A) of the DOT's
Origin and Destination Survey for the fourth quarter of 1985. This databank is
generated quarterly from a 10 percent sample of all airline tickets written in
the U.S. Each record contains an airline itinerary (a route flown on a given
carrier), a dollar fare, and the number of passengers observed on the itinerary
at the given fare during the quarter. The distance of the trip and the fare
class are also shown.
To construct network characteristics, we restrict attention to DB1A
records with itineraries of the following type: 2-segment same-carrier round
trips and 4-segment same-carrier round trips where the intermediate (hub)
airport is the same in both directions. After imposing several other
restrictions" and dropping repeated itineraries (which arise because of
multiple fares), we are left with 23,428 unique 4-segment itineraries and 6319
unique 2-segment itineraries.-'-" This data set, which records traffic patterns
°The routing for a 2-segment round trip lists three aiports (i.e., LAX-SFO-
LAX) , while a 4-segment routing lists five airports (i.e., LAX-DFW-JFK-DFW-
LAX) . Along with 1-segment trips, which typically represent shuttle
flights, these 2- and 4-segment records cover the vast majority of airline
travel in the U.S. Moreover, 4-segment travel is quantitatively
significant. Of the 1,356,000 passengers observed making 2- or 4-segment
trips (restricted as described above), somewhat less than one-third
(405,000) made 4-segment trips (recall that these numbers represent a 10%
sample)
.
'Records whose itineraries contain travel outside the continental U.S. are
excluded, as are records with a fare of less than $10 (the latter criterion,
which is meant to eliminate frequent-flier tickets, follows Borenstein
(1989)). Also, we restrict attention to records showing 2 or more
passengers (this corresponds to total quarterly traffic on the route of at
least 20 passengers)
.
LUSince different itineraries can be used within one market, the above figures
overstate the number of city-pair markets observed in the data. The total
number of 4-segment markets is in fact 8179, and the number of 2-segment
markets is 2170. Traffic is not always observed in both directions in a
market (this is often true in thin markets)
.
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among a chosen set of 267 cities ,** is used to construct the network
characteristics. It is important to note that, as in previous research, each
airport is treated as a different endpoint. 12 Therefore, multiple-airport
cities such as New York and Los Angeles contain several distinct
destinations .
"
From the discussion in Section 2, we expect the fare in an individual
market to be a decreasing function of network size. Although size was
represented by n (the number of cities served) in the simple model of the last
section, that model was based on the assumption that travel occurred in each
possible city-pair market. Since this will not be true in real networks, n is
not necessarily a good predictor of traffic flows on the network spokes (and
thus of cost per passenger) . A better measure of these flows is total 4-
segment city-pairs connected by the network, denoted NTWCITP4. When the spokes
'•'-Construction of this list is explained below when the regression data set is
discussed.
l^See, for example, Borenstein (1989). Merging the different airports requires
arbitrary decisions and, in our case, leads to computational difficulties.
"A problem with the data is that some carriers indicate a destination or
origin in the New York and Washington, D.C., areas by the overall city codes
NYC and WAS without listing the specific airport used. While Borenstein
(1989) deletes such records, this solution is inadvisable in our case
because it discards information critical to the construction of the
networks. Our solution is as follows. For each record including a NYC or
WAS code, we consulted the Official Airline Guide to find the actual airport
or airports used by the carrier on the route. If a single airport appeared,
its name replaced the NYC or WAS designation. When a carrier was listed as
flying to several airports, we randomly replaced the NYC or WAS designation
with the code of one of the airports used. For example, if the OAG showed
that a carrier using an NYC code flew to La Guardia (LGA) and Newark (EWR)
,
the NYC designation was replaced with LGA with probability 1/2 and by EWR
with probability 1/2. This solution is imperfect, but it preserves valuable
information.
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of the network are symmetric, the 4-segment portion of total traffic on each
spoke will be proportional to NTWCITP4. *'*
Based on the earlier analyis , we also expect fares in the market to
depend on the populations of cities served by the network, with larger cities
leading to lower fares when increasing returns are sufficiently strong. To
capture this effect, we compute the variable NTWAVGPP, which equals the average
"population potential" of 4-segment markets in the network. A market's
population potential equals the square root of the product of the city
populations (population is measured in 10,000's).^^ This quantity is summed
across 4-segment city pairs and divided by NTWCITP4 to arrive at NTWAVGPP. We
expect fares to be inversely related to NTWAVGPP under strong increasing
returns
.
The previous analysis also showed that competition in both 4-segment
markets (e.g., AB) and 2-segment markets (e.g., AH) raised fares elsewhere in
the network. The first effect is captured by the variable NTWC0M4, which
equals the fraction of the network's 4-segment markets where at least one
competing carrier is present. Competing carriers could provide service through
the same hub, a different hub, or could provide direct (nonstop) service. 1°
^Referring to (5) , total non-hub market traffic along each spoke will be
proportional to NTWCITP4 divided by n. In the more realistic case where the
network spokes are asymmetric, this divisor will differ from n, being larger
(smaller) when the spoke is heavily (lightly) travelled. Such asymmetry is
taken into account below by the introduction of two additional variables
indicating the fraction of network city pairs that include the market's
origin city and the fraction that include the destination. These variables
are discussed below in the section dealing with market-specific variables.
l^In the case of big cities, the population of the entire metropolitan area
containing the airport is used (the actual city population is used for small
urban areas). Details are available on request.
l^One feature of the DB1A data is that nonstop service in a market is
indistinguishable from same-plane one-stop service (both yield two ticket
12
The second effect is captured by NTWCOM2 , which equals the fraction of the
network's 2 -segment markets experiencing competition (two segment markets are
those where one endpoint is the hub). Competitors could offer either 2- or 4-
segment service. We expect fares in a given market to be increasing in both
NTWC0M4 and NTWC0M2
.
Table 1 shows the values of the above variables for the major networks
along with some other variables of interest (networks with NTWCITP4 values
below 60 are not shown) . POINTS equals the number of cities connected to the
hub. Since POINTS is computed as the number of cities from among our 267 that
appear in 2- or 4- segment itineraries, it may understate the number of points
actually served by the carrier (our list may exclude actual endpoints, or
traffic may not be observed to some cities on our list that are in fact
served). U4 is the network's 4-segment "utilization rate," which equals
NTWCITP4 divided by the number of possible 4-segment markets,
P0INTS*(P0INTS-l)/2. U2 is the network's 2-segment utilization rate, equal to
the number of 2-segment markets (not shown) divided by POINTS. Finally,
NTWC0M4S equals the fraction of the network's 4-segment markets experiencing
"same-hub" competition (where the competitor uses the same hub)
.
Table 1 shows a large range of network sizes in 1985. The largest system
in terms of city pairs connected is American's Dallas-Ft. Worth network, which
serves 1564 city pairs. The Atlanta networks of Delta and Eastern are close
behind in size, followed by the networks of US Air at Pittsburgh and United at
Chicago-O'Hare . The population potential of networks also varies considerably.
The Denver/Frontier, Minneapolis/Republic, and Phoenix/America West networks
show low values of NTWAVGPP, indicating service to small cities, while the high
NTWAVGPP values for the Denver/Continental, Kansas City/Eastern,
coupons for a round trip, and thus show up as 2-segment trips). As
measured, direct (2-segment) service may thus involve a stop.
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Chicago/Midway, and St. Louis/TWA networks indicate that these systems tend to
connect large cities.
The U2 and U4 variables indicate how successful a network is in
generating traffic among the cities that it serves. A relatively low value of
U4, for example, indicates that service is observed in a small fraction of the
4-segment markets in which connections are feasible. On this criterion,
relatively unsuccessful networks include Baltimore -Washington/Piedmont
,
Denver/United, Kansas City/Eastern, Chicago -0' Hare/United, and Philadelphia/US
Air, all of which have U4 values below .200. Successful networks, on the other
hand, include Atlanta/Delta, Charlotte/Piedmont, Denver/Frontier,
Chicago/Midway, Memphis/Republic, Phoenix/America West, Pittsburgh/US Air, Salt
Lake City/Western, and St. Louis/TWA, all of which have U4 values above .350.
The underlying reasons for variation in U4 are not immediately apparent. A low
value of NTwAVGPP might be expected to lead to a low U4, but Table 1 shows
numerous counterexamples. Similarly, network size is not a good predictor of
U4, as inspection of the table shows . 17
The variable U2 , which naturally takes higher values than U4 , also shows
some variation across networks. A U2 value below one indicates that some
cities that are endpoints of 4-segment trips are not observed as endpoints for
2
-segment trips. Apparently, this outcome can occur when the hub itself is not
an attractive destination for residents of the non-hub cities of the network, *-°
or when some of these cities are so small that they generate too little traffic
•'•'Like all of the network calculations in this paper, the utilization rates do
not capture flight frequency, which ideally would be taken into account in
appraising the "success" of a network.
J
-°Also, the distance to the hub from some of the network cities could be so
short that air travel is uneconomical.
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in the hub-inclusive market to be observed. 19 a combination of these factors
may explain the low U2 values for the Baltimore -Washington/Piedmont,
Dayton/Piedmont, and Philadelphia/US Air networks.
The NTWC0M4 numbers show that networks experience varying degrees of
competition in their 4- segment markets. At one extreme, competition is present
in all of the 4-segment markets served by the Kansas -City/Eastern network. At
the other extreme, United faced at least one competitor in just 40% of the 4-
segment markets served out of its San Francisco hub. Other networks facing
relatively low levels of 4-segment competition are Charlotte/Piedmont,
Dayton/Piedmont, Denver/Frontier, Dallas -Ft. Worth/American, Detroit/Republic,
Minneapolis/Republic, Philadelphia/US Air, Pittsburgh/US Air, and St.
Louis/Ozark. Interestingly, three of the carriers in this list (Frontier,
Republic, and Ozark) were acquired in mergers shortly after 1985. Values of
NTWC0M2 show similar variation, with the Chicago -Midway/Midway and
Dayton/Piedmont networks noteworthy for the small amount of competition in
their 2 -segment markets . 20
Low values of NTWC0M4S indicate that few of the network's 4-segment
markets experience same -hub competition, implying that the hub airport does not
support another carrier's hub -and- spoke network. This, of course, does not
preclude competition in the 4-segment markets, which occurs through other hubs
or in direct service. Table 1 shows that low (or zero) values of NTWC0M4S are
often accompanied by high values of NTWC0M4, as in the case of Philadelphia/US
Air.
J- yWhen traffic is low, the city has a better chance of showing up in one of
many non-hub markets than in the single hub- inclusive market.
9^ uThe Midway figure highlights the fact the Midway is treated as a different
destination than Chicago
-0' Hare
.
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4. The Regression Data Set
To generate the regression data, we return to the initial set of 4-
segment records, including those with repeated itineraries due to multiple
fares. Since we wish to avoid records that represent very thin markets or
unusual fares, records with fewer than four passengers are excluded. 21 We also
exclude records where the fare class was not YD (coach discount) for all
segments of the trip (this eliminates about one-third of the data). The reason
for this exclusion is to focus on the airline's most competitive fares. YD
fares should be most closely linked to costs, and they also should be least
contaminated by the effects of frequent- flier programs, which have been
discussed at length in the literature (see especially Borenstein (1988, 1989)).
Next, the fare data is merged with the network information calculated above,
and records showing travel within a small network (where NTWCITP4 is less than
10) are excluded. This leaves 10,523 records. The last step is to exclude
records where the origin or destination is a hub for the carrier. Since such a
trip involves travel between two of the carrier's hubs, it in effect occurs
within two networks. This last exclusion leaves 9964 records. 22
As a result of multiple fares, there are 6054 distinct itineraries among
these 9964 observations. 3888 of these itineraries have a single fare, 1236
have two observed fares, 505 have three, and the balance (7%) have four or more
observed fares. In performing the regressions, we take two alternative
9
1
ZJ
-These 4-passenger records reflect the results of the randomization described
in footnote 13.
9 9zz0ur list of 267 cities was generated by taking all cities observed in the 4-
segment data and excluding a sufficient number to satisfy memory limits in
the Fortran program that calculated the network characteristics. The 40
cities excluded were the 40 with the smallest populations among those
showing zero passenger enplanements in the FAA data (zero-enplanement cities
in the FAA data are served by commuter carriers). The regression data, of
course, excludes records with cities not on the list.
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approaches. One uses all the data, treating each fare observation as
distinct. 23 The other approach treats each itinerary as a single observation,
setting the fare value for those itineraries that are repeated equal to the
passenger-weighted mean of the multiple fares. While the latter approach
throws away information and may also create serious aggregation bias (see Elrod
(1983)), it is presented for purposes of comparison. Finally, it should be
noted that since our specification allows fares in a market to vary
directionally, itineraries in opposite directions within one market are not
viewed as the same. 24
Each observation contains values for the network- specific variables
NTWCITP4, NTWAVGPP, NTWC0M4, and NTWCOM2. 25 Two additional variables that are
jointly market- and network- specific are also computed. The first variable,
denoted ORIGSHR, is equal to the share (fraction) of the network's 4-segment
city-pair markets that include the observation's origin city. Analogously,
DESTSHR equals the share of the network's 4-segment markets that include the
destination city. ORIGSHR and DESTSHR are used to account for the fact (noted
above) that the origin and destination cities may not be equally connected to
the network, making NTWCITP4 an imperfect representative of traffic flows on
23in this respect, our data set differs from that of Borenstein (1989). By
focusing on thick markets, Borenstein had enough fare variation in each
market to estimate separate equations for various fare quantiles (20%,
median, etc
.
)
.
^Calculation of the network variables described above does not, of course,
depend on the direction of travel in a market.
25in addition to those shown in Table 1, a number of small networks (with
NTWCITP4 values between 10 and 60) appear in the regression data set. These
are Indianapolis/US Air, Denver/Aspen, Memphis/Delta, Charlotte/Eastern,
Houston/Eastern, Tampa/Northwest, Washington-Dulles/New York Air, San
Francisco/Air Cal , John F. Kennedy/TWA, Syracuse/Empire, Los
Angeles/Western, Orlando/Florida Express, and Chicago-O'Hare/Air Wisconsin.
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the spokes . To see this , note that a large value of ORIGSHR means that traffic
is observed between the origin and many other points in the network. This
means that traffic density should be high on the spoke between the origin city
and the hub, leading to low cost per passenger over a portion of the route and
thus to low fares in the market. For the same reason, a high value of DESTSHR
should lower costs on the spoke connecting the destination to the hub, again
leading to low fares in the market. Note that, holding ORIGSHR and DESTSHR
constant, an increase in NTWCITP4 simultaneously increases the number of cities
connected to origin and destination, lowering costs on both spokes
simultaneously and thus reducing fares in the market. 2°
The set of purely market-specific variables is as follows. MKTPP is the
population potential in the market, equal to the square root of the product of
the city populations. This is a demand variable, and its effect on fares
should be negative when increasing returns are strong. Another demand variable
is INCORIG, which equals per capita income for the origin city. 27 Its effect
on fares could be in the same direction as that of MKTPP (negative) , but price
discrimination on the basis of city income could lead to a different result. 2°
2
"An alternative approach is to use the numbers of city pairs that include the
origin and destination as explanatory variables, dropping NTWCITP4 (these
variables are the product of ORIGSHR (DESTSHR) and NTWCITP4) . Our approach,
however, is superior on theoretical grounds since it recognizes that the
aircraft sizes in an airline's fleet (and thus cost per passenger) are
chosen partly on the basis of average traffic density on the spokes of its
network, which is in turn related to NTWCITP4
. In effect, the specification
without NTWCITP4 implicitly assumes that aircraft types can be tailored to
exactly suit densities on individual spokes, which may be unrealistic.
9 7Z/ The per capita income figure for the proper geographic unit (metropolitan
area vs. city; see footnote 15) is used.
9 QzoAnother possibility is that the demand for service "quality" rises with
income, and that fares rise to reflect the resulting higher cost. The
quality dimension could include load factor (with high- income consumers
willing to pay for less-crowded aircraft) as well as flight frequency.
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We do not use destination income as an explanatory variable on the belief that
carriers' pricing policies are directionally sensitive and that this variable
would have little or no effect on the demand for trips out of the origin. The
final demand variable is TEMPDIF, which equals the mean January temperature at
the destination minus the mean temperature at the origin. A large value of
TEMPDIF, which indicates a market with high tourism potential, should reduce
fares as carriers respond to the elastic travel demands of vacationers. 29
DIST equals the one-way distance of the trip, and is expected to have a
positive impact on fares. Following earlier research, we also include dummy
variables to represent the four slot-controlled airports: Chicago-O'Hare (ORD)
,
Washington-National (DCA) , La Guardia (LGA) , and John F. Kennedy (JFK). A
given variable assumes the value one if either the origin or destination for
the market is the airport in question. 30 Since slot control restricts the
supply of airline service, the dummy coefficients are expected to be positive.
To measure the effects of competition, we compute the total number of
carriers competing with the observed carrier in the market, denoted MKTCOM.
There are three possible types of competition (4-segment same-hub, 4-segment
interhub, or direct) , but distinguishing between them added little to the
results. 31 While it is possible to use the MKTCOM variable directly in the
^ yWe also experimented with Borenstein's (1989) tourism variable, city hotel
receipts as a fraction of personal income, but it performed poorly.
*0we tried Borenstein's (1989) approach of including dummies for a large number
of congested airports. The results were largely unaffected by this
alteration, and moreover, many airport variables had insignificant or
significantly negative coefficients, contrary to the rationale for their
use
.
-^The same carrier is counted as a competitor more than once if it offers
several routings in the market. For example, if a carrier offers both
interhub and direct service, it is counted as two competitors. Since the
availability of several routings yields greater scheduling convenience, a
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regressions , 32 more insight is gained by following Morrison and Winston (1989)
and constructing a set of variables that allows the effect of extra competition
to depend on the initial number of competitors. Accordingly, we created the
variables MKTC0M1, MKTCOM23, and MKTC0M4+, defined as follows:
\ MKTCOM if MKTCOM =0,1
MKTC0M1 - f
L 1 otherwise
/' if MKTCOM = 0,1
\
MKTCOM23 -A MKTCOM-1 if MKTCOM = 2,3
L 2 otherwise
^0 if MKTCOM = 0,1,2,3
MKTC0M4+ = }
MKTCOM- 3 otherwise
MKTCOMl's coefficient gives the effect on fares of increasing MKTCOM from to
1; MKTCOM23's coefficient gives the effect of increasing MKTCOM from 1 to 2 or
from 2 to 3; MKTC0M4+'s coefficient gives the effect of increasing MKTCOM from
3 to 4 and beyond. We expect the coefficients of these successive variables to
be negative and declining in absolute value, indicating diminishing returns to
competition.
We again follow Morrison and Winston (1989) by including a variable to
measure potential competition in the market. 33 This variable, denoted MKTPCOM,
is equal to the number of carriers that serve both endpoints of the market but
carrier offering such flexibility provides more effective competition in the
market than a carrier that offers a single routing.
^^Results from this specification are shown in the appendix as part of the
discussion of two-stage least squares estimates.
33For other discussions of potential competition, see Morrison and Winston
(1987) and Peteraf (1986).
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do not provide service in the market itself. Finally, in order to capture
carrier fixed effects, a set of carrier dummy variables is included in the
estimating equation (American is the default carrier) . In addition to
controlling for differences in the airlines' cost structures, these variables
should net out the effect of frequent -flier programs (carriers with attractive
programs can charge higher fares). It should be noted that failure to include
the airline dummies could lead to biased coefficients of the network variables,
which could then be contaminated by carrier fixed effects.
It is important to realize that the issue of airport dominance, which
figures prominently in the papers of Borenstein (1988, 1989) and Morrison and
Winston (1989, 1990), does not arise in the present setting. The reason is
that our focus on 4- segment trips (and our subsequent elimination of
itineraries where the origin or destination is a hub for the carrier) means
that no carrier exercises airport dominance at the endpoints of a market where
it is observed. -^ It is interesting, however, to consider what happens to a
carrier's fares when a market endpoint is dominated by another carrier (such
markets are in fact present in the data). To address this issue, we construct
dummy variables 0RIGC0NC and DESTCONC, which take the value one when the origin
or destination airport is a concentrated hub (with a single carrier accounting
for more than 60% of total enplanements) . These airports are Charlotte,
Dayton, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Chicago-Midway, Memphis, Salt Lake City, and
Pittsburgh. On the one hand, the high fares charged by the airport's dominant
carrier should allow fringe competitors to charge similarly high fares,
-^A single carrier may provide the only service at some small airports, but the
absence of entry barriers at such endpoints means the airports are not
dominated. In light of this observation, the interpretation of Borenstein'
s
airport-enplanement-share dominance variable is not clear. The high value
of this variable at a small, single-carrier airport does not imply
domination of the airport by that carrier.
21
implying positive coefficients for the concentration dummies. On the other
hand, fringe competitors attempting to gain a foothold at the airport may be
forced to charge lower fares than the dominant carrier in order to attract
passengers. " with the dominant carrier's fares already high, the result may
be an average fare level for the competitor, implying insignificant dummy
coefficients
.
Table 3 shows the variable means as well as minimum and maximum values
for the non-dummy variables. With the exception of FARE, these values are
computed on the "mean- fare" data set, where repeated itineraries are eliminated
(the mean FARE is computed using all 9964 observations) . Note that the means
of the carrier dummies give the frequency with which the carriers appear in the
mean- fare data set. 3° Note also that the variable NPASS, which gives total
passengers per itinerary, is shown (this variable is not used in the
regressions). The variables MKTCOM and MKTPCOM, which have large ranges, are
distributed as follows: MKTCOM equals zero for 21% of the observations
(indicating no competition in the market). It equals 1 for 16%, 2 for 15%, 3
for 11%, 4 for 9%, 5 for 7%, and 6 or more for the remaining 21% of the
observations (the median value is 2) . MKTPCOM equals zero for 14% of the
observations (indicating no potential competition). It equals 1 for 22%, 2 for
->JBeyond the effect of entry barriers, the dominant carrier is presumed to
exercise market power because airport dominance enhances the attractiveness
of its frequent- flier program and also leads local travel agents to favor
its computer reservation system over those of competitors (see Borenstein
(1989)).
-""American accounts for 19% of the itineraries. An anomaly is the low
frequency of Delta observations. The reason for this is that the data shows
Delta as writing very few coach discount (YD) tickets, which are those
represented by the data. This pattern also appears in the DB1A data for
other years.
22
22%, 3 for 19%, and 4 or more for the remaining 23% of the observations (the
median value is again 2).
5. Empirical Results
The dependent variable for the regressions is the natural logarithm of
FARE. 37 with the exception of distance, which appears in log form as LDIST,
all the explanatory variables are untrans formed. The main regression results
are presented in Table 4. The first column of the table shows the coefficients
for an equation estimated on the entire data set (described as ALL) . The dummy
coefficients for this equation are presented in Table 5 (the equation does not
include the variables ORIGCONC and DESTCONC , which are added later).
The results in the first column provide strong support for the analytical
framework developed in this paper. The coefficient of NTWCITP4 is negative and
significant, indicating that fares are low, as predicted, when the market is
served by a large network. The strength of this effect is indicated in Table
6, which shows that fares in a market fall by half a percent when the network
grows in size by 100 city pairs. 38 The coefficients of ORIGSHR and DESTSHR are
also negative and significant, indicating that, holding NTWCITP4 fixed, fares
are low when the origin and destination are well-connected to the rest of the
network (recall that spoke traffic will be high and cost per passenger low in
this case). Table 6 shows that when ORIGSHR (DESTSHR) increases by one
standard deviation (.04 for both), fares fall by 3.4% (3.7%). Since the
coefficients of these variables are not significantly different from one
another, these effects are in fact indistinguishable.
-•'FARE gives the round- trip ticket price.
O QJO Since the dependent variable is in log form, this number comes from
multiplying NTWCITP4's coefficient by 100. The same principle applies to
other calculations in Table 6.
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The coefficient of NTWAVGPP is also negative and significant, indicating
that when the network serves large cities, fares in any given market are low.
This result suggests that the cost savings from high traffic densities in a
network serving large markets are passed on to consumers. While this outcome
requires strong increasing returns in the monopoly model discussed above, its
emergence here might be the result of competitive pressures combined with
moderate or weak increasing returns. Table 6 shows that increasing NTWAVGPP by
41 (one standard deviation) lowers fares in a given market by 1.9%.
The network competition variables NTWC0M4 and NTWC0M2 both have positive
coefficients, although only NTWC0M4's is significant. Thus, as predicted, a
network with pervasive competition in its 4-segment markets has high fares as a
result of the cost- increasing leakage of traffic to competitors. A one-
standard- deviation increase in NTWC0M4 (an increase of .15) raises fares by
2.9%. Although 2 -segment competition was also expected to raise fares, the
insignificant effect of NTWC0M2 could be due to the relatively small variation
in this variable across networks.
Taken as a group, the above network variables are strongly significant,
with the F statistic for the joint test of zero coefficients significant at the
.0001 level. One implication of this finding is that fare equations that omit
network variables are misspecified. 39 More generally, our results provide the
first concrete evidence linking a detailed set of network charateristics to
airfares. This evidence indirectly confirms the importance of networks in
lowering airline costs.
Turning to the market-specific variables, distance has the expected
positive effect on fares, with LDIST's highly-significant coefficient
n QJ
'If the estimated fare equation controls for traffic densities on the spokes
(properly treating them as endogenous) , then network variables could be
omitted.
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indicating an elasticity of 0.4. MKTPP's significantly negative coefficient
shows that fares are low when the market contains large cities, with a one-
standard-deviation increase in this variable (equal to 143) lowering fares by
0.9%. While this effect follows that of NTWAVGPP, it is interesting to note
that the network variable's coefficient is seven times as large in absolute
value as MKTPP's. This suggests that network population potential is more
important in reducing fares than market potential, a finding that makes sense
given that the network spokes connecting the cities in a particular market
carry traffic bound for many other destinations.
The significantly positive coefficient of INCORIG shows that residents of
high- income cities pay high fares. Price discrimination would explain this
outcome if consumer demand for air travel were to become less elastic as income
grows. Whatever the explanation, Table 6 shows that a $1210 increase (one
standard deviation) in per capita income raises fares by 1.2%. TEMPDIF's
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that markets where the
destination's January temperature is high relative to the origin's have low
fares. The magnitude of this tourism effect is indicated in Table 6, which
shows that a 22 degree increase in TEMPDIF lowers fares by 1.8%.
The MKTCOM coefficients, all of which are negative and significant, show
diminishing returns to market competition, as expected. The magnitude of
MKTCOMl's coefficient shows that addition of the first competitor to a monopoly
market lowers fares by 7.7%. Addition of a second or third competitor reduces
fares by a further 3.4%, while the addition of an extra competitor beyond three
lowers fares by a further 0.6%.^^ Also, the addition of a potential competitor
to the market (a unit increase in MKTPCOM) lowers fares by 1.6%. It is
^uThe MKTCOM coefficients are significantly different from one another in
pairwise tests.
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interesting to note that the percentage impact on fares of adding the first
competitor to a monopoly market is larger than any other effect listed in Table
6.
Turning to the dummy coefficients shown in Table 5, we see that slot
control leads to higher fares at only two of the four controlled airports (the
coefficients of LGA and JFK are insignificant). Fares are higher by 4.7% when
the origin or destination is Chicago-O'Hare , while a Washington-National origin
or destination raises fares by 9.8%. The airline dummies also show many
significant carrier effects. Among the major carriers, those charging fares
significantly higher than American's for a given trip are Delta (+14.6%),
Eastern (+5.3%), and United (+8.0%). Those charging lower fares are
Continental (-9.9%), Frontier (-9.2%), America West (-10.6%), and Piedmont
(-6.6%).
The next step is to explore whether the empirical results are robust with
respect to the type of sample data used. In particular, we reestimate the
equation on the mean- fare sample, where repeated itineraries are collapsed into
a single observation (the fare value is set equal to the passenger weighted
mean of the multiple fares). While there is no good reason to prefer this
approach to use of the entire sample (fare information is thrown away and
aggregation bias may arise) , the results are presented for comparison. The
results, shown in the third column of Table 4, are somewhat different from
those in the first column. In particular, the coefficients of NTWCITP4,
NTWAVGPP, and MKTPP coefficients are insignificant. However, as seen in the
fourth column of the table, deletion of MKTPCOM (the potential competition
variable) improves the performance of the equation. With MKTPCOM deleted, the
NTWCITP4 and MKTPP coefficients regain signficance, although the NTWAVGPP
coefficient is still insignificant (for comparison, the second column shows
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results of running the same regression on the entire sample). *1 The results in
column four thus lend further support to our basic hypotheses. However, lack
of a good justification for the mean-fare approach makes the results based on
the complete sample more credible.
The fifth column of Table 4 shows the effect of adding the airport-
concentration dummies ORIGCONC and DESTCONC to the equation of column one.
This change has little effect on the other coefficients. The dummy
coefficients show that a concentrated origin has no significant effect on fares
while a concentrated destination raises fares by 3.7%. Evidently, in competing
for passengers at a concentrated origin, fringe firms keep their fares below
those of the dominant carrier (leaving fares at an average level, as explained
above) . Since this competitive motive is absent when the destination is the
concentrated endpoint (passengers are then collected at an unconcentrated
origin) , carriers are free to exploit the "umbrella" effect generated by the
dominant carrier, which leads to high fares. These results provide an
interesting extension to previous findings on airport dominance (see Borenstein
(1989)).
The preceding discussion has ignored the possibility that the number of
carriers competing in the market is an endogenous variable. Morrison and
Winston (1989), who use similar competition variables, recognize this drawback
but argue that a proper correction for endogeneity would require a complete
structural model of the airline's fleet allocation process within its
network. ^^ While we are aware that proper handling of endogeneity would be
very difficult, we experimented with a crude simultaneity correction to see how
^Also, the NTWC0M4 coefficient becomes marginally significant.
^For analyses of entry in airline markets, see Berry (1989), Reiss and Spiller
(1989), and Morrison and Winston (1990).
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it affected the results. The first step was to abandon the three market-
competition variables, and replace them with the single (endogenous) variable
MKTCOM, equal to the number of carriers competing with the observed carrier in
the market (endogeneity corrections using the three separate competition
measures would have been impractical). After adding a number of instruments,
the fare equation was estimated using two-stage least squares. The results,
which are presented in the appendix, show that our main findings are reasonably
robust to a simultaneity correction.
6. Merger Simulations
By 1987, the acquisitions of Ozark by TWA and of Republic by Northwest
were complete, leading to larger consolidated hub-and- spoke networks at St.
Louis and Minneapolis. These mergers created monopolies on many 2 -segment
routes out of St. Louis and Minneapolis, leading to concern about higher fares.
Borenstein (1990), U.S. General Accounting Office (1988), Department of
Transportation (1989), and Werden, Joskow, and Johnson (1989) investigated
actual fare changes in the 2-segment markets, with mixed results. Fare
increases did occur, but some markets experienced little fare change or saw
decreases
.
There has been no study of fare changes in the 4-segment markets served
by the St. Louis and Minneapolis hubs. As explained above, mergers are less
likely to create a monopoly in such markets because competition can continue
through other hubs. For this reason, efficiency gains from the merger are less
likely to be offset by anticompetitive effects, making it more likely that the
4-segment markets enjoy welfare gains.
The impact of the mergers on 4-segment fares can be studied using the
equation estimated above. There are four sources of fare change in a given
market when networks are blended as a result of a merger: competition in the
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market may be reduced, the new network is larger than either of the previous
networks (NTWCITP4 rises) , the network has different average population
potential (NTWAVGPP changes) , and it has a different level of 4-segment
competition (NTWC0M4 changes) . The first part of Table 7 shows how the post-
merger networks differ from the original networks of the 4 merger partners
.
NTWCITP4 rises in each case, but population potential and competition fall for
the large (acquiring) carriers while rising for the small carriers. The latter
changes push fares in opposite directions (higher population potential lowers
fares, while higher competition raises them); a larger network reduces fares.^-3
The fare impacts of the mergers are computed taking account of these
sources of change.^ Computations are done separately for each of the four
carriers under different assumptions about initial competition in the market.
Referring to Table 7, we see that on an original TWA route where Ozark was not
present, the merger reduces fares by a statistically-significant 3.7%. Since
there is no loss of competition on such a route, the merger's impact is found
by aggregating the effects on fares of a larger network (-2.6%), lower 4-
segment competition (-2.7%), and lower population potential (+1.6%), which lead
to the net change of -3.7%. The same combination of forces yields a 3.6%
reduction in fares on original Northwest routes where Republic was not present
^These calculations are based on network characteristics computed for the 4th
quarter of 1988. The NTWAVGPP and NTWC0M4 values for the merged networks
were set equal to the 1988 St. Louis/TWA and Minneapolis/Northwest values.
However, instead of setting NTWCITP4 equal to the 1988 numbers, the fact
that all networks grew in size between 1985 and 1988 was taken into account
(this growth presumably reflects the general increase in traffic). The 1988
TWA and Northwest NTWCITP4 values were deflated by average growth of all
networks over 1985-1988 to arrive at estimates of the size of the TWA and
Northwest networks immediately after the merger. The weights in the
weighted average calculation were derived from relative shares of total
enplanements at the hub airports.
^The calculations are based on the coefficients in the first column of Table
4.
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(see the second half of Table 7). For the smaller carriers, the merger has the
reverse effects on NTWAVGPP and NTWC0M4 (see the top of Table 7), and fare
reductions are smaller. Fares on original Ozark routes without TWA fall by
1.3% (a value not significantly different from zero), while fares on original
Republic routes without Northwest fall by 1.1% (significant only at the 10%
level). 45
While both mergers thus put downward pressure on fares in markets where
there was no reduction in competition, a different picture emerges in markets
where the merging carriers competed. In such cases, the network effects are
countered by the effect of reduced competition, which in turn depends on the
the number of competitors initially present. Table 7 shows that fares rise
significantly in markets served only by the merging carriers. For example,
fares on original TWA routes where Ozark was the only competitor rise by 3.9%,
while fares on original Ozark routes where TWA was the only competitor rise by
6.3%. A weighted average of these fare changes (indicating average change in
the market) is 4.7%. These numbers, along with the analogous Northwest-
Republic figures, show that complete elimination of competition swamps the
network effects of the merger, leading to higher fares.
The outcome is different when the merger does not create a market
monopoly. When 1 or 2 other competitors are present in a market served by the
merging carriers, the loss of a competitor by itself does not lead to as large
an increase in fares. In this situation, network and competition effects
cancel, as can be seen in Table 7. Three of four individual fare changes, as
well as both of the weighted-average changes, are insignificant in this case.
When 3 or more airlines compete with the merging carriers in the market,
^Since the model is estimated using coach-discount (YD) fares, these impacts
only apply to this fare class (recall, however, that the YD class includes
most of the DB1A data)
.
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reduction of competition has virtually no effect on fares. In this case,
network effects dominate and both of the weighted- average fare changes are
significantly negative.^"
These calculations show that competitive effects are strong relative to
the network effects of a merger. However, since Table 7 shows that competition
between the merging carriers occurs in relatively few markets, competitive
effects play a minor role in determining the overall impact of each merger on
4- segment passengers. In the case of St. Louis, for example, markets served by
TWA but not Ozark account for 59% of all markets served by one or both
carriers, while markets served by Ozark but not TWA account for 31% of the
total (the numbers in parentheses in Table 7 show the relative frequency of
market types).^ The balance of the markets (only 10%) have competition
between TWA and Ozark (as seen in Table 7, 1% of the total have no other
carriers aside from TWA and Ozark, 2% have one or two, and 7% have three or
more additional carriers) . Since the merger has no effect competition outside
this small number of markets, network effects dominate in determining its
overall impact. As a result, fares in the 4- segment markets fall on average in
response to the merger, with the weighted average fare change across the
*°If the specification is modified to follow Morrison and Winston (1989), with
extra competitors beyond one treated identically, then the simulation
results are different. In this case MKTCOM23 and MKTC0M4+ are replaced by a
single variable MKTC0M2+. Because MKTC0M2+'s coefficient is small in
absolute value, fares fall in markets served by both TWA and Ozark and at
least one additional carrier. Given that our MKTCOM coefficients are
significantly different from one another (see footnote 40) , Morrison and
Winston's specification and the associated simulation results are
inappropriate for our data.
^'Since these numbers are based on the data used to construct network
characteristics (DB1A records with 2 or more passengers) , all actual service
may not be captured.
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different market types equal to -2.7% (this number is statistically
significant)
.
A similar outcome emerges in the case of Minneapolis. Markets served by
only one of the merger partners account for 82% of the total (20% of the
markets are served by Northwest but not Republic, while 62% have Republic but
not Northwest) . With competitive effects present in only 18% of the markets
(see Table 6 for details on their structure), network effects again dominate,
reducing fares on average by a statistically- significant 1.2% across markets.
This number is smaller than the St. Louis figure because the increase in
network size is smaller for each Minneapolis carrier and because competitive
effects are present in a greater share of the markets. °
7. Conclusion
This paper has provided the first detailed evidence linking airline fares
to the structure of hub-and-spoke networks. Our results validate the basic
hypothesis that forces leading to higher traffic densities on the spokes of a
network reduce fares in the various markets it serves. This finding provides
indirect evidence of the importance of networks in reducing airline costs.
The paper also sheds new light on the issue of hub concentration. Our
findings show that a merger leading to a concentrated hub also generates an
efficiency gain by creating a larger network. The simulation results suggest
that in the 4-segment markets, where the merger has little effect on
competition, this efficiency gain is passed on to passengers in the form of
lower fares. This effect cushions the losses from higher fares paid by hub-
originating and hub -terminating passengers, who may experience a significant
reduction in competition as a result of the merger.
We are currently studying actual (as opposed to simulated) fare changes in
the 4-segment markets served through St. Louis and Minneapolis.
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Future research on network effects could take an approach less Indirect
than ours by studying the impact of network structure on actual traffic
densities on the spoke routes. Since traffic and fares are jointly determined,
however, such an investigation would require a structural model. In any case,
given that hub-and-spoke networks will play a key role in airline operations
for decades to come, further study of their impact deserves high priority.
33
Appendix
In performing two -stage least squares on the equation containing MKTCOM,
we dropped the potential competition variable for reasons explained above, and
added the following instruments to identify the equation: INCDEST, per capita
income at the destination; CHINORIG, CHINDEST, percentage changes in per capita
incomes at the origin and destination over the period 1979-1983; CHPORIG,
CHPDEST, percentage changes in populations at the origin and destination over
the period 1980-1986; HOTLDEST, HOTLORIG , hotel receipts as a fraction of total
personal income at the origin and destination; CAPORIG, CAPDEST, dummy
variables indicating whether the origin or destination is a state capital. The
results of a two-stage least squares regression using these variables are
reported in the second column of Table Al (all the explanatory variables other
than MKTCOM are exogenous) . The estimates are computed using the entire data
set. The first column of the Table reports OLS results for this
- r-- - AQ
specification. ^
The OLS results are similar to the first-column results from Table 4,
although the NTWAVGPP and NTWC0M4 coefficients are insignificant.
Interestingly, the MKTCOM coefficient, which shows that addition of a
competitor reduces fares by only 1.5%, dramatically understates the impact
(from a better-specified equation) of adding the first few competitors to a
monopolized market. The 2SLS results in column two are similar to the OLS
estimates, but there are notable qualitative and quantitative differences.-^
Both the NTWAVGPP and MKTPP coefficients change sign from positive to negative,
with the latter being significant (NTWAVGPP' s coefficient remains
^ yThe coefficients for the slot-control and carrier dummies are not reported
for either equation.
-^It should be noted that a standard endogeneity test indicates that MKTPCOM is
indeed endogenous
.
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insignificant). Some other coefficient magnitudes change dramatically, with
MKTCOM's estimate indicating a stronger effect of competition (adding a
competitor now reduces fares by 5.9%).
These results show that our main findings are reasonably robust to a
crude simultaneity correction. Despite the poor performance of the population
potential variables, the coefficients of NTWCITP4, ORIGSHR, and DESTSHR remain
signficant and have magnitudes similar to their Table 1 values. The
differences between the estimates and those in Table 4 may result from
collapsing the separate market-competition variables into one, which leads to a
misspecified equation.
AFigure 1.
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1306
Hub/Carrier
Atlanta/Delta
Atlanta/Eastern
Baltimore-Wash. /Piedmont 214
Charlotte/Piedmont 716
Dayton/Piedmont 158
Denver/Continental 307
Table 1
NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS (4th QUARTER 1985)
NTWCITP4 POINTS U4 U2 NTWC0M4 NTWCOM2 NTWC0M4S NTWAVGPP
Denver/Frontier
Denver/United
498
635
Dallas-Ft. Worth/American 1564
Dallas-Ft. Worth/Delta 402
Detroit/Republic 528
Houston/Continental 325
Kansas City/Eastern 125
Chicago (Midway) /Midway 64
Memphis/Republic 668
Minneapolis/Northwest 242
Minneapolis/Republic 480
Chicago (0'Hare)/American 758
Philadelphia/US Air 144
Phoenix/America West 140
Pittsburgh/US Air 1243
San Francisco/United 133
Salt Lake City/Western 537
86 .347 .884 .701 .921 .476
91 .319 .879 .779 .962 .498
47 .198 .787 .692 .568 .005
59 .418 .949 .588 .661 .053
33
44
50
82
101
55
61
44
39
19
57
42
78
Chicago (0'Hare)/United 1033 116
42
St. Louis/Ozark 445
37
52
54
.299 .788 .665 .462 .000
.325 .886 .932 1.000 .554
.407 1.000 .673
.191 1.000 .800
.271 .982 .948
.289 .852 .642
.344 .909 .794
.419 .947 .704
59 .281 .966 .429
.155 .931 .754
.167 .738 .507
81 .384 .914 .526
.405 1.000 .611
.311 .926 .544
.900
.927
.310 .990 .650 .870
.374 1.000 .984 .053
.704
.754
.963
.903
.568
.200 .973 .398 .750
.407
.426
.227
.944 .868
.769 .013
.950 .052
.169 .949 1.000 .946 .064
.000
.058
.281 1.000 .740 .952 .368
185
.252 1.000 .815 .962 .506
.372
.000
22 .606 1.000 .700 .682 .014
.000
.030
.692 .000
.800 .247
113.1
131.5
130.2
127.4
135.4
204.4
75.2
140.6
134.7
152.4
156.2
170.2
291.1
252.7
134.2
183.4
81.7
174.1
151.4
113.0
86.7
135.2
97.7
115.6
111.4
St. Louis/TWA 756 63 .387 .938 .952 .967 .146 196.0
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Table 2
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
NTWCITPA
:
The number of A-segment city-pair markets connected by the network
NTWAVGPP: The average population potential of the network's A-segment city-pair markets, where population
potential equals the square root of the product of the market city populations
NTWCOMA
:
The fraction of the network's A-segment city-pair markets where at least one competitor is present
NTWCOM2: The fraction of the network's 2-segment markets where at least one competitor is present
ORIGSHR: The fraction of the network's A-segment city-pair markets that include the origin city
DESTSHR: The fraction of the network's A-segment markets that include the destination city
DIST: One-way flight distance for the market
MKTPP: The market's population potential (see NTWAVGPP)
INCORIG: Per capita income for the origin city
TEMPDIF: The mean January temperature at the destination minus the mean temperature at the origin
MKTCOM: The number of carriers competing with the given carrier in the market
MKTPCOM: The number of carriers serving both endpoints of the market without serving the market itself
FARE: The dollar fare
ORD, LGA,
JFK, DCA: Dummy variables taking the value one if origin or destination is one of the given airports
ORIGCONC: A dummy variable taking the value one if the origin is a concentrated hub airport
DESTCONC: A dummy variable taking the value one if the destination is a concentrated hub airport
POINTS: The number of non-hub cities served by the network
UA: The network's A-segment utilization rate, equal to NTWCITPA divided by POINTS A (P0INTS-l)/2
U2: The network's 2-segment utilization rate, equal to the number of 2-segment markets divided by
POINTS
NTWCOMAS: The fraction of the network's A-segment markets with same-hub competition
NPASS
:
Number of passengers on a record.
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Table 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
NTWCITP4 785 11 1564
NTWAVGPP 144.6 8.2 335.5
NTWC0M4 .706 .000 1.000
NTWCOM2 .813 .053 1.000
ORIGSHR .053 .001 .385
DESTSHR .052 .001 .385
DIST 1296 157 3471
MKTPP 167.3 2.0 1191.8
INCORIG 10160 5001 19411
TEMPDIF 3.8 -55.9 55.9
MKTCOM 3.39 22
MKTPCOM 2.32 11
NPASS 11.41 4 270
FARE* 269 34 1380
Dummy Means
:
Carriers: Other:
US AIR .082 ORD .039
ASPEN .002 LGA .034
CONTINENTAL .056 DCA .040
DELTA .005 JKF .004
EASTERN .100 ORIGCONC .041
FRONTIER .030 DESTCONC .044
AMERICA WEST .030
MIDWAY .014
NORTHWEST .017
NEW YORK AIR .001
AIR CAL .001
OZARK .017
PIEDMONT .105
REPUBLIC .102
TRANS WORLD .089
UNITED .094
EMPIRE .003
WESTERN .053
FLORIDA EXPRESS .008
AIR WISCONSIN .001
FARE'S mean value is computed using all 9964 observations. Other means are computed from the mean-fare data
set, where repeated itineraries are dropped (it has 6054 observations).
Table 4 : REGRESSION RESULTS
(t-ratios in parenthesis)
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Variable/Sampl e ALL ALL MEAN-FARE MEAN-FARE ALL
INTERCEPT 3.005 2.920 3.124 3.039 3.008
(33.36) (32.53) (29.27) (28.51) (33.40)
NTWCITP4 -0.0000489 -0.0000666 -0.0000238 -0.0000403 -0.0000495
(3.08) (4.22) (1.25) (2.13) (3.12)
NTWAVGPP -0.000460 -0.000482 0.00000463 -0.0000113 -0.000466
(2.47) (2.58) (0.02) (0.05) (2.50)
NTWC0M4 0.191 0.188 0.134 0.129 0.192
(3.31) (3.25) (1.95) (1.87) (3.32)
NTWC0M2 0.015 0.00663 0.112 0.0941 0.0145
(0.24) (0.11) (1.47) (1.23) (0.24)
ORIGSHR -0.854 -0.925 -0.887 -0.964 -0.861
(7.10) (7.68) (6.29) (6.82) (7.14)
DESTSHR -0.929 -0.996 -1.034 -1.108 -0.921
(7.57) (8.10) (7.18) (7.68) (7.50)
LDIST 0.373 0.390 0.337 0.356 0.373
(47.93) (51.98) (37.22) (40.68) (47.93)
MKTPP -0.0000625 -0.000101 -0.0000466 -0.0000934 -0.0000651
(2.06) (3.38) (1.29) (2.62) (2.15)
INCORIG 0.00000994 0.00000831 0.0000111 0.00000927 0.00000978
(3.67) (3.06) (3.51) (2.92) (3.60)
TEMPDIF -0.000818 -0.000825 -0.000894 -0.000912 -0.000794
(5.98) (6.01) (5.47) (5.56) (5.79)
MKTCCM1 -0.0766 -0.0844 -0.0708 -0.0798 -0.0764
(7.75) (8.56) (6.23) (7.03) (7.74)
MKTC0M23 -0.0344 -0.0405 -0.0414 -0.0482 -0.0341
(7.19) (8.53) (7.22) (8.47) (7.14)
MKTC0M4+ -0.00625 -0.00524 -0.00585 -0.00456 -0.00622
(4.30) (3.60) (3.23) (2.52) (4.27)
MKTPCOM -0.0156 ** -0.0172 ** -0.0157
(8.17) (7.47) (8.22)
ORIGCONC ftft Aft ** ** -0.0158
(1.06)
DESTCONC ft* ft* ** ** 0.0370
(2.45)
R2 .3610 .3567 .3838 .3781 .3615
Table 5
AIRPORT AND PAPP XER DUMMY COEFFICIENTS
(Estimates are for first equation of Table 4;
t-ratios in parentheses)
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UKD 0.0466 MIDWAY
-0.0611
(2.95) (0.96)
LGA 0.00214 KORTHWEST 0.0454
(0.13) (1.68)
JFK
-0.654 NEW YORK AIR 0.0201
(1.13) (1.52)
DCA 0.0978 AIR CAL
-0.0163
(6.73) (0.12)
US AIR 0.00907 OZARK
-0.0372
(0.40) (1.16)
ASPEN ' 0.252 PIEDMONT
-0.0657
(2.83) (2.71)
CONTINENTAL
-0.0994 REPUBLIC 0.0296
(4.79) (1.48)
DELTA 0.146 TRANS WORLD 0.00370
(2.88) (0.24)
EASTERN 0.0531 UNITED 0.0802
(4.07) (5.48)
FRONTIER
-0.0918 EMPIRE 0.124
(3.23) (5.25)
AMERICA WEST
-0. 106 FLORIDA EXPRESS 0. 118
(3.39) (3.47)
AIR WISCONSIN 0.638
(5.84)
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Table 6
IMPACTS OF VARIABLES ON FARES
Variable change Percentage Change in Fare
Network 4-segment city-pairs increases by 100 -0.51
Network average population potential increases by 41 (one std. dev.
)
-1.91
Fraction of network 4-segment markets with competition increases by .15 (one std. dev.) +2.92
Fraction of network 4-segment markets that include origin increases by .04 (one std. dev.) -3.42
Fraction of network 4-segment markets that include destination increases by .04 (one std. dev.) -3.72
Distance increases by 12 +0.42
Market population potential increases by 143 (one std. dev.) -0.92
Per capita income of origin city increases by 1210 (one std. dev.) + 1.2%
January temperature differential increases by 22 degrees (one std. dev.) -1.82
Number of market competitors increases from zero to one -7.72
Number of market competitors increases from one to two or from two to three -3.42
Number of market competitors increases from three to four -0.62
Number of potential competitors increases by one -1.62
Origin or destination is Chicago-O'Hare +4.72
Origin or destination is Washington-National +9.82
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Table 7
Merger Simulations
Change in:
Pre-Merger Carrier/Hub NTWCITP4 NTWAVGPP NTWCOM4
TWA/St. Louis
Ozark/St. Louis
Northwest/Minneapolis
Republic /Minneapolis
+532 -34.9 -.143
+843 +49.7 + .265
+557 -84.1 -.247
+319 +17.6 + .064
ST. LOUIS NETWORK FARE CHANGES:
Fare changes on original TWA routes under different competitive conditions :
TWA without Ozark (.59): -3 . 7Z*
TWA and Ozark with no competitors: +3.91*
TWA and Ozark with 1 or 2 competitors: -0.31
TWA and Ozark with 3 or more competitors: -3.11*
Fare changes on original Ozark routes under different competitive conditions :
Ozark without TWA (.31): -1.31
Ozark and TWA with no competitors: +6.3Z*
Ozark and TWA with 1 or 2 competitors: +2.1Z
Ozark and TWA with 3 or more competitors: -0.7Z*
Weighted average fare changes on routes served by both TWA and Ozark
TWA and Ozark with no competitors (.01): +4.7%*
TWA and Ozark with 1 or 2 competitors (.02): +0 . 5Z
TWA and Ozark with 3 or more competitors (.07): -2.3Z*
* - fare change significantly different from zero at the 5Z level
Numbers in parentheses give relative frequency of each type of market
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Table 7 continued
MINNEAPOLIS NETWORK FARE CHANGES:
Fare changes on original Northwest routes under different competit ive conditions:
Northwest without Republic (.20): -3.61*
Northwest and Republic with no competitors: +4 . IX*
Northwest and Republic with 1 or 2 competitors: -0.1X
Northwest and Republic with 3 or more competitors: -3.0%*
Fare changes on original Republic routes under different competitive conditions:
Republic without Northwest (.62): -1.1X**
Republic and Northwest with no competitors: +6. 51*
Republic and Northwest with 1 or 2 competitors: +2.3X*
Republic and Northwest with 3 of more competitors: -0.5X
Weighted average fare changes on routes served by both Northwest and Ozark
Northwest and Republic with no competitors (.06): +5.2X*
Northwest and Republic with 1 or 2 competitors (.03): +1.0X
Northwest and Republic with 3 or more competitors (.09): -1.8X*
* - fare change significantly different from zero at the 5X level
** - fare change significantly different from zero at the 10X level
Numbers in parentheses give relative frequency of each type of market
Table Al
Two-Stage Least Squares Results
(Based on entire sample; t-ratios in parentheses)
43
Variable OLS 2SLS
INTERCEPT 2.954 2.214
(32.75) (17.74)
NTWCITP4 -0.0000737 -0.0000712
(4.63) (4.19)
NTWAVGPP -0.000259 0.000246
(1.38) (1.18)
NTWC0M4 0.0834 0.135
(1.44) (2.17)
NTWC0M2 0.00415 0.0933
(0.07) (1.41)
ORIGSHR -0.946 -0.996
(7.79) (7.68)
DESTSHR -0.990 -0.963
(7.98) (7.27)
LDIST 0.385 0.457
(51.01) (40.96)
MKTPP -0.0000884 0.000465
(2.93) (6.88)
INCORIG 0.00000551 0.0000143
(2.02) (4.68)
TEMPDIF -0.000862 -0.000475
(6.22) (3.09)
MKTCOM -0.0149 -0.0592
(12.51) (12.04)
.3446
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